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l i l t i
Psychologists defi ne stereotype as a preconceived or 
oversimplifi ed generalization about an entire group of objects 
or people (i.e. a prejudice) without regard for individual 
differences. Stereotypes are based on some idea of ideal 
type or abstract familiarity. They can be closely related to 
each other and develop into hierarchical systems with broad 
categories being the general types and specifi c categories 
being subtypes. As such, they can even serve as (more or 
less unrefl ected) frameworks of scientifi c theories where 
they are used as heuristics in order to arrive at scientifi c 
conclusions.
The process of stereotyping involves the mental 
categorizing and labelling of objects, people and events 
by using poor or little information, which results in false 
conclusions about the individual elements within broader 
or specifi c groups and in misleading assessments of 
their relationships. Of course, this is also true for social 
scientifi c theories that (more or less unrefl ectedly) use 
certain categories and patterns of thought and then show 
up in the hypotheses the researchers start with, the methods 
they think of as adequately related to their research, and 
their interpretation of the data they collect. According to 
an ideal understanding of the scientifi c process, learning 
from the results of our studies might in the end help 
to identify the lasting effects of mere stereotypes and 
develop refi nements that help to overcome them. Thus, as 
often said, stereotypes are conceptual schemes that seem 
necessary and even inevitable within the research process 
where they function as initial prejudices that, through 
the process of scientifi c investigation, lead to adequate 
judgments. One of the main obstacles that must be 
overcome when doing social psychology in cross-cultural 
comparison is a very specifi c bundle of stereotypes: 
ethnocentrism.
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In the so-called culturally informed branches of 
psychology, namely in cross-cultural, cultural and 
indigenous psychology, researchers might be more aware 
than those in other fi elds of psychology of the problem 
of ethnocentrism that is closely related to the problem of 
stereotypes. According to W. G. Sumner who is said to have 
coined the term, ethnocentrism refers to the tendency to 
interpret or evaluate other cultures in terms of one’s own, 
based on thinking patterns and attitudes in which one’s own 
group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled 
and rated in reference to it. In a more dramatic comment on 
this seemingly harmless psychological description, he put 
ethnocentrism at the center of intergroup and intercultural 
confl icts: “loyalty to the group, sacrifi ce for it, hatred and 
contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness 
without” (Sumner 1906, pp 12). Thus, the vast range of 
social scientifi c domains in which ethnocentrism became a 
key concept for understanding interpersonal and intergroup 
relations as well as aspects of identity development 
became clear and emphasized the need to understand the 
development and social function of ethnocentrism and 
stereotypes embedded within. This can be clearly seen 
in some of modern social psychology’s most prominent 
representatives (e.g. in the foundational works of Allport, 
Sherif and Tajfel).
Although there is no doubt that the psychological 
relevance of stereotypes and the role that stereotyping 
plays in ethnocentric attitudes has been an important topic 
in social psychology, the question concerning if and how 
stereotypes and ethnocentrism infl uence psychology as 
an academic endeavor is rarely raised in the discipline 
itself. That kind of refl ection about socio-historical and 
cultural infl uences on the endeavor called “science” owes 
most to disciplines like philosophy of science, sociology 
of knowledge, and literary and postcolonial studies (for a 
short overview see Arnason 2003). These disciplines have 
made it clear that ethnocentrism also has an impact on our 
assessment of stereotypes and our willingness to refl ect 
on them. In addition, they might infl uence how successful 
we are in detecting, minimizing or even overcoming rigid 
conceptual schemes that do no justice to the “others” and 
no justice to ourselves when we as scientists try to identify 
universals and specifi cs in the realm of psychology. 
In the following, I will elaborate on this topic by 
giving examples for the stereotypical construction of the 
“West” and the “East” in mainstream cross-cultural social 
psychology and by showing how current infl uential theories 
in the discipline still carry on stereotypical assumptions 
about “Indians” and other “others” who, from a Western 
point of view, are “Easterners.”
The Construction of India and the “East” in 
“Western” Thinking 
A region of contradictions, monstrosities and defi cits
According to Edward Said, the moral and the social sciences, 
as they were institutionalized at European and American 
universities in the 19th century, were the breeding ground 
of what he and others call “Orientalism.” The concept of 
“Orientalism” aims at characterizing Western scholars’ more 
or less deliberate efforts to construct the “East” as a mirror 
image of what is alien and inferior (i.e. the “Other”) to the 
supposedly superior West. Since Said’s examples of these 
Western efforts were mainly taken from the moral sciences, 
especially from philology, philosophy, literature and art, the 
empirically oriented social sciences do not seem to have 
felt challenged by his criticism. However, the impact that 
“Orientalist” perspectives might have in disciplines like cross-
cultural social psychology or cultural psychology should be 
clear since the problem under discussion is closely related 
to the problem of ethnocentrism (see above). Some of the 
questions raised and repeated in the discussion of Orientalism 
are central to some of the most eminent scholars in the fi eld 
of social theory (e.g. Gramsci, Foucault and Chomsky) and 
can be paraphrased thus (cf. Foucault 1970; Said 1978): 
What are the regularities that can be found in our attempts 
to scientifi cally deal with so-called “foreign” or “different” 
cultures? How did they enter the history of sciences and 
how deep is our current thinking and research still rooted in 
the specifi c history of thoughts that are part of our cultural 
heritage? How do these culturally shaped regularities 
produce specifi cally structured discourses about the “other” 
and how much refl ection do social scientists invest in order to 
control for the damaging effects of stereotypes that become 
central cognitive schemes within institutionalized academic 
thinking? It should be self-evident that these questions need 
to be addressed and answered by social psychologists, too, 
for these two reasons especially: First, stereotypes as well 
as functions and processes of stereotyping rank high among 
their discipline’s most important topics; second, by the 
discipline’s self-understanding, the goal of social psychology 
is to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings and 
behaviors of individuals and groups are infl uenced by the 
actual, imagined or implied presence of others. This, of 
course, although not being a central issue in current social 
psychology, includes the question in how far our theories 
about the relevance of social context and our imaginations 
about the “others” infl uence our scientifi c research. In the 
following, I will present a short sketch of a tradition of 
stereotyping India and the Indians in Western thinking. Then 
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I will try to show how some of these stereotypes are still 
effective in the construction of “West-East differences” and 
the theories that are meant to give scientifi c plausibility to 
this construction. 
The earliest written accounts of India and its inhabitants 
by “Westerners” can be found in the works of Greek and 
Roman authors, for example, in Ctesias’ Indica (5th century 
BC) Herodotus’ Histories (also 5th century BC) and Pliny’s 
Natural History (1st century AD). According to most of 
these authors, India is the country in the farthest Eastern 
corner on earth and a country of astonishing contrasts 
and contradictions where elysian regions border on large 
deserts, where wealth meets poverty, where people with 
stoic attitudes live next to immoral tribes, and where 
various life forms can be found, ranging from dark skinned 
humans, a plenitude of strange animals (e.g. unicorns) and 
even “monsters,” i.e. creatures that bridge the gap between 
animals and humans without belonging to any of the two 
groups, e.g. the Cynocephali (“dog-headed men”). Though 
some of the ethnographic details about India seem to be 
based on reliable ethnographic information, in general and 
from early on, these accounts introduce India and the South 
Asian region as a “land of miracles and wonders.” Though 
this is not necessarily a pejorative, it has been frequently 
accompanied by xenophobic aspects as documented, for 
example, in the ancient Greek play “The Persians,” in which 
Aeschylus (5th century BC) described Athens’ enemies in 
the East using a delicate blend of admiration, fascination and 
fear. These themes survived the centuries of the European 
Middle Ages, were refl ected in the reports of European 
travelers like Ludovico di Varthema (who in the 16th 
century interpreted sculptures of Indian deities as images 
of monsters) and even fl ourished in the Romantic Era. The 
Age of Enlightenment, rooted in the philosophical ideas of 
17th century rationalism and empiricism and considered 
the ideological foundation of the scientifi c revolution and 
industrialization of the 18th and 19th century, did not 
completely abandon all the notional and historically grown 
stereotypical imaginations about India.
In his lectures on the philosophy of history, G. W. F. 
Hegel differentiated between China and India as the two most 
important cradles of “Asian thinking.” Although, he conceived 
of both civilizations as backward societies, as many scholars 
before and after him, he contrasted the prosaic mind of China 
(that has its expression in the stable Chinese state) with the 
dreamy and tumbling fantasy of the Indian spirit which has 
its correspondence in the uninhibited Indian society (Hegel 
1832–1848/1986). To a large extent, Hegel had nothing but 
contempt for India and the Indians. The basic character of the 
Indian, he maintained, consists of malice, trickiness, stealing, 
robbing and murder. Hegel also identifi ed the philosophical 
and psychological sources of such weakness of character: It 
is the almost complete lack of any proper science and the 
boundless and erratic mode of abstract Indian thinking from 
which no concept of individuality or personality could arise 
because within this thinking the subject-object difference is 
declared an illusion which needs to be overcome. Against 
this philosophical and psychological background (that was 
co-constituted by infl uential European thinkers like Hobbes, 
Hume, Locke, Smith, Bentham, Mill and others) Hegel 
concluded that there was also no possibility for a historical 
consciousness or for a conceptualization of individuals as 
historical persons to develop. Moreover, in the same line of 
thought, Hegel justifi ed the British colonization of India as 
a logical stage (a “fatal destiny”) in the process of societal 
evolution that resulted in bestowing the idea of a stable self 
and a stable nation on India and the Indians. In other words, 
Hegel’s account of Indian culture and Indians is a diagnosis 
of psychological and sociological defi cits and it is especially 
these defi cits that allow one to differentiate between the West 
and the East. 
Though the writings of Karl Marx show a somewhat 
greater degree of sympathy for the detrimental effects of 
British colonization in India (see Chakkarath 2010), in 
the end he agrees that India had no sense of history and 
that British colonialism was therefore a necessary step 
in India’s development into a nation state with a national 
identity. India, he states, could not avoid the “fate of being 
conquered,” and the whole of the country’s past history, if 
anything, was the history of the series of conquests it has 
undergone (Marx 1853/1981).
It is worth mentioning that within this tradition of 
thought, which stretches from the Era of Enlightenment to 
the early 20th century, even the ancient European theme of 
Indian monsters reappears. For example, in his assessment 
of Indian art, John Ruskin, the British art critic, echoed 
Hegel’s and many others’ conviction that so-called Indian 
art is proof of the childlike backwardness of Indian culture 
and its members as it consists of nothing but ugly forms and 
monstrosities with numerous arms and heads (for a detailed 
account, see Mitter 1992; Beal 2002). 
Many elements that show up in this very brief sketch of a 
powerful European tradition of thought about non-Westerners 
show up again in later classical works of the social sciences, 
though in modifi ed and more refi ned versions. Perhaps the 
most infl uential modern work of that kind that has ever 
helped establish some of the ethnocentric assessments of the 
“East” by Western scholars is Max Weber’s cross-cultural 
comparison of religion and worldviews and their functional 
role for the psychological, social and economic development 
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of Western and Eastern societies (e.g. Weber 1905/2002). 
Drawing on the theme of “defi ciency” already stressed by 
Hegel, he states that the civilizations of the Orient were not 
able to develop the kind of rationalism that led to steady 
disenchantment in the occidental world and was the central 
condition for the scientifi c revolution that could only take 
place in the West. However, being the cautious intellectual 
he was and although he contributed largely to establishing 
the “West-East” dichotomy in the modern social sciences, 
he frequently adds the notion that this at least is what 
Europeans “like to think.”
Colonialism, Colonial Education, and the 
Import of Western Psychology
As we have seen, European assessments of Indian culture 
and the Indian “psyche” as well as the teleological and 
evolutionary explanations for the plenitude of social and 
psychological defi cits within the “childlike” Indians not 
only served scientifi c, but also political goals. The defi cits 
were primarily used to justify Western imperialism and 
colonialism and to interpret both as a giant endeavor aimed 
at taking care of those regions and societies in the world 
that otherwise would not develop at all. Of course, the 
concept of “development” employed in this endeavor was 
one developed in Europe, bearing all the stereotypical and 
ethnocentric assumptions of what needs to be developed, 
how it should be developed, and for what purpose. Logically, 
only those who possessed an historical consciousness and 
had already reached the peak of history would know the 
answers to these questions. Those who were to be developed 
appeared as savages that needed to be civilized, a motive that 
survived in Western social sciences until the 20th century 
(see Jahoda 1999). 
It is against this background that Western scientifi c 
concepts were introduced and aimed at replacing anything 
that, according to these concepts, was unscientifi c, irrational, 
obscure, and therefore impedimental to progress (Bhatia 
2002). It was Thomas B. Macaulay, historian and politician 
serving on the Supreme Council of India, who famously 
assessed that it was “no exaggeration to say that all the 
historical information which has been collected from all 
the books written in the Sanskrit language is less valuable 
than what may be found in the most paltry abridgments used 
at preparatory schools in England” (Macaulay 1835/1972 
pp 241). He concluded that it was the British mission “to 
form a class who may be interpreters between us and the 
millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood 
and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in 
intellect.” It would then be the task of this new class to enrich 
the Indian languages “with terms of science borrowed from 
the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fi t 
vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the 
population” (Macaulay 1835/1972, pp 241).
Of course, in the line of thinkers like Hegel, it was 
presupposed that the Indians had never come up with 
anything by themselves that could be considered of 
scientifi c or developmental value. This, however, is a 
false assumption, derived from the hierarchical systems of 
stereotypes and schemes according to which there cannot 
be any scientifi c development where there is no historical 
development and also there cannot be any development 
at all where there is no Western rationalism and Western 
individuality to carry it. 
From its early beginnings and for many centuries, some 
of the scientifi c and technological knowledge produced in 
India was trendsetting and infl uenced the development of 
science in many regions of the world, including the West 
(cf. Arnold 2000; Baber 1996; Chakkarath 2010). Though 
for the ethnocentric reasons mentioned above, ancient 
and medieval Western scholars quite rarely acknowledged 
the quality of Indian intellectuality and scientifi c merits, 
Chinese and Arab scholars did so readily (Sen 2005). 
Even when European Romanticists began admiring Indian 
knowledge, most of them appreciated it as “Indian wisdom,” 
embedded more in Indian philosophy and spirituality 
than in science (Halbfass 1988). Thus, even the various 
and rich contributions of Indian scholars to the fi eld that 
we nowadays call “psychology” were seen as speculative, 
theological, and metaphysical accounts about the human 
soul. In addition, Western scholars failed to recognize that 
many of these theories were based on well refi ned methods 
of controlled introspection and resulted in various insightful 
conceptualizations of psychological phenomena, processes 
and functioning. Theories about self, subjectivity, personality 
and identity have always been at the center of Indian 
psychological theories. Topics like cognition, motivation, 
emotion, attachment and detachment, consciousness, and 
memory are frequently discussed in classical and other texts 
that were written before British colonization and education 
began (Bharati 1985; Chakkarath 2005; Paranjpe 1998). It 
is worth mentioning that among the psychological interests 
of Indian scholars, even theories of human development, 
including a lifespan perspective, played an important role 
from early on, as did the development of various therapeutic 
techniques (Chakkarath in press). 
Western scholars’ assessment of Indian and other 
non-Western scientifi c achievements has been largely 
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ethnocentric as can be seen in most Western historiographies 
of psychology, which are also the main sources of historical 
information for most Indian psychologists. In addition, 
by representing itself as a discipline with an experimental 
orientation adopted from the natural sciences, Western 
psychology has made it even more diffi cult for the fi rst 
generations of Indian scholars trained in Western psychology 
to relate it to older, indigenous traditions of psychological 
thought. In other words: At least in the fi eld of academic 
psychology and the social sciences in general, Indians 
suddenly and ironically had no sense of their own history. 
Stereotyping, as we know from social psychological research, 
can result in making the stereotyped individuals belief in 
the accuracy of the stereotypes themselves (Chakkarath 
2007). To put it more provocatively and to paraphrase the 
thoughts of Hegel and Marx: The country’s entire history of 
psychology, if anything, was now the history of a series of 
concepts translated by Macaulay’s children.
The Construction of the Eastern “Other” in 
Western Psychology
As we saw above, the self concept embedded in Western 
thinking about the self and the other focuses on the idea 
of an independent and stable individual who has a clear 
historical consciousness and a clear sense of responsibility 
for his actions. In a striking consequence, within the 
historically rooted individual centered theories of Western 
provenance, entire cultures and nations also became 
virtual individuals. One of the best known examples of 
the effect this perspective had on personality and culture 
research is Ruth Benedict’s “The Chrysanthemum and 
the Sword.” In her study, Benedict (1946) draws upon the 
deeply rooted stereotypical West-East differentiation and 
uses well-established dichotomous dimensions in order to 
show that the Japanese are psychologically and therefore 
anthropologically different from the Westerners. Her most 
famous account of the Japanese psyche is what she calls 
the Japanese “shame culture,” which she contrasts with the 
American and (more generally) the Christian “guilt culture.” 
According to Benedict, when it comes to questions of moral 
conduct, the Japanese especially evaluate how one’s conduct 
appears to outsiders and feel shame instead of guilt. Thus, the 
feeling of responsibility merely shows up at the surface of 
their psychological costume and only if (and as long as) the 
community condemns the individual for his/her behavior. In 
contrast, Westerners experience guilt (i.e. a deep conviction 
of personal moral responsibility in which the emphasis is on 
the individual’s internal conscience). Benedict’s description 
of the Japanese has often been criticized for its ethnocentric 
elements and the implication that the value and belief 
systems in Western culture result in superior morality as 
compared to the moral attitudes of the Japanese and other 
East Asians. However, as we saw above, her theory does 
not employ a completely new perspective on the West’s 
“understanding” of Easterners. It just transports elements 
of centuries-old stereotypes into the social sciences of the 
20th century. A more recent example of their infl uence on 
even more infl uential psychological concepts is Kohlberg’s 
theory of socio-moral development that has frequently been 
criticized for its cultural bias. Though Kohlberg’s idea was 
to prove the universal validity of the assumption that all 
people in all cultures go through the same stages of moral 
development in the same order, his understanding of higher 
expressions of morality was as clearly shaped by Western 
concepts as was Benedict’s theory: by emphasising the 
individual, the ideals of modern Western democracy, and 
related concepts of justice and responsibility, which were 
developed by scholars of European Enlightenment. Studies 
conducted in India and other Asian regions have shown that, 
with regard to moral attitudes, the attempt to understand 
morality mainly in terms of cognitive development can lead 
to an underestimation of the cultural socialization context 
and the role of social interactions (for an overview, see 
Miller 2006). In other words, psychological research in 
cultural or cross-cultural psychology should always include 
broad social psychological perspectives, but it often does 
not. However, even many of the theories that at fi rst glance 
seem to be culture-informed and equipped with insights from 
social psychology bear many elements that are reminiscent 
of ethnocentric patterns of thought. 
In line with the efforts of many cultural anthropologists 
like Benedict, Geert Hofstede (2000) also tries to differentiate 
between cultures by using uni- and bipolar scales on which the 
respective cultures can be positioned according to the intensity 
or presence of fi ve attributes, or “cultural dimensions”: low 
vs. high power distance, low vs. high uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity vs. femininity, individualism vs. collectivism, 
and long- vs. short-term orientation (a dimension originally 
called “Confucian Dynamism” when it was introduced by M. 
H. Bond and his colleagues to describe especially East Asian 
samples). The most infl uential among these dimensions – 
and probably the most infl uential concept in cross-cultural 
psychology – is the concept of “individualism” as compared 
to “collectivism.” The roots of this differentiation can 
easily be traced back to the social philosophies of ancient 
Greece (Kagitçibasi 1996). Individualism started serving as 
one of the central cultural “identity markers” of the West 
during the Renaissance before it became the stereotypical 
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foil against which the “West” distinguished itself from the 
“East” (see above). As in the case of the exemplary theories 
of Benedict and Kohlberg, again, one must realize that 
by using these simplistic dichotomies, which willingly or 
unwillingly parallel the traditional dichotomy of “East” and 
“West,” one transmits the old ethnocentric assumption of 
the West’s superiority into modern social and cross-cultural 
psychology. This can be seen in mainstream psychology’s 
well-established tendency to conceive of nations as cultures 
and to perceive them as almost crystallized individual entities 
that somehow refl ect their cultural members’ psychological 
makeup. Taking this assumption as a starting point, many 
scholars like Hofstede have argued that it is no coincidence 
that the modernized and technologically advanced societies 
are those that have fostered and encouraged individualistic 
ideals (e.g. through corresponding education goals and 
parenting styles). Although Hofstede himself failed to 
explain how the ambiguous results for countries like Japan 
and India support this general hypothesis, this did not harm 
the success of his dimensions of which the individualism 
dimension is often treated like an overarching concept to 
the other four dimensions. Taken together, these so-called 
culture dimensions refl ect many of the elements that the 
critics of “Orientalism” have identifi ed as key stereotypes in 
the Western view of the Eastern world and that can be found 
in many current theories that also employ dichotomous 
conceptualizations and elaborate on the theme of West-East 
differentiations: Easterners do not have a stable self, they 
therefore require powerful and assertive authority fi gures as 
well as very rigid societal norms and tight social networks 
that allow them to cope with their uncertainties that arise 
from their comparative lack of internal control which is often 
rooted in metaphysical beliefs which frequently arise from 
irrational worldviews. Moreover, their own distrust in their 
individual capabilities leads to a limitation of Easterners’ 
creativity, an assumption by the way that can be connected 
to Lewin’s classic social psychological studies on leadership 
styles, where creativity was most effectively stimulated by 
what Lewin preferred to call “democratic” leadership style as 
compared to a less effective style that he called “autocratic” 
and that would fi t the descriptions that Hofstede and others 
give for collectivistic East Asian nations. Similar to Hegel’s 
account of the Easterner’s psyche, in these theories again 
Eastern societies appear static and more interested in personal 
as well as abstract long-term orientations than in the idea 
of societal development and progress. In addition, even the 
Orientalists’ theme of depicting the Easterners as feminine 
(as opposed to the assertive and risk-loving “masculinity” of 
the advanced West) reappears in these modern versions of 
traditional European thought patterns. There is also a subtle 
reappearance of the idea that Western values and belief 
systems that foster the development of individualism and 
autonomy are more desirable than others (Sampson 1993).
Due to space restrictions, I am not able to discuss in 
detail in how far additional theories in social, cross-cultural, 
and cultural psychology also refl ect and transport these 
established thought patterns. I can just call to the reader’s 
attention the fact that Triandis’ differentiation between 
ideocentric and allocentric tendencies in individuals or 
Markus and Kitayama’s contrasting of the independent 
and interdependent self are other infl uential theories that 
also draw upon dichotomies like autonomy vs. relatedness, 
separation vs. connectedness, high vs. low self monitoring, 
high vs. low context dependence, stability vs. instability, 
individual orientation vs. group orientation, etc. that in most 
cases were developed within the more general dichotomy of 
West-East differences.
The same is true for more recent studies conducted on 
the topics of social cognition and cognitive styles across 
cultures (e.g. Nisbett 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi and 
Norenzanan 2001). Based on empirical studies and drawing 
from philosophical traditions, ancient worldviews, social 
structures and educational practices, Peng and Nisbett have 
introduced a theory about culturally dependent modes of 
thinking, including perception, interpreting, reasoning, 
dealing with contradictions, etc. According to this theory 
which leaves no doubt about its West-East perspective 
(in Nisbett’s book, they are even highlighted as the two 
essential poles within the “geography of thought”), East 
Asian thought is “holistic” (or as the authors sometimes 
prefer to call it, “dialectic”). Easterners are said to perceive 
the perceptual fi eld as a whole and therefore try to fi nd 
relations between objects and events within that fi eld. 
Moreover, when confronted with contradictions, they seek a 
“middle road” in order to resolve them. Westerners, on the 
other hand, are said to have an “analytic” mode of thinking, 
i.e. they rely far more on the use of categories or on formal 
logic. Instead of looking for relations between individual 
elements, they prefer to separate them from contexts and 
treat them as individual objects or persons. 
It is clear that this theory can be considered the cognitive 
foundation for many of the other theories and concepts 
mentioned above. As it seems, it is for certain culturally 
preferred thinking styles that many of these differences 
between Westerners and Easterners and the historical 
development of their societies arise. The theory has been 
heavily and justifi ably criticized for its inadequate description 
of European and Asian sociocultural development and 
philosophical traditions (including the unconventional use 
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of terms like “holistic,” “analytic” and “dialectic”; see for 
example Ratner and Lumei 2003). Within the context of 
my considerations, however, the theory can be seen as a 
contribution for the benefi t of the argument that there are 
culturally grown patterns of Western thinking that do not 
only affect the cognitive styles of Western participants in 
psychological laboratories, but also of Western psychologists. 
Ironically, the theory proposed by Nisbett and Peng, of which 
the latter was not socialized in the “West” from the beginning 
but in the “East,” has plenty of the ingredients of what they 
call the “analytic” style of Western thinking, especially the 
dichotomy between East and West as well as the bipolar 
nature of their key concepts. It seems that the Westernization 
of psychology makes it hardly possible to come up with 
theories that represent “holistic” approaches and accounts. 
Or do we simply have to accept that Hegel and all the other 
Western representatives of the “analytic” thinking style 
were correct in their assessment that the “Easterners” were 
incapable of developing a sense of their own traditions and 
a sense of rational science and therefore had no other choice 
but to learn it from the developed West?
Conclusions 
It is diffi cult to answer the preceding question. Whatever 
the answer might be, however, within the context of 
considerations I presented above, the question cannot 
be adequately answered without answering it from a 
psychological perspective, too. 
As I tried to show, Western social, cross-cultural, and 
cultural psychology have not convincingly shown that 
their culturally inherited bias with respect to other cultures 
has already been overcome. Provocatively, one might say 
that within the constructions of current developmental 
and social psychology, Indians and other “Easterners” are 
still somehow reminiscent of the ancient European reports 
about fabulous creatures that supposedly lived in the East 
and are signifi cantly different from Westerners. Though 
it is too easy to deal with this fact by simply accusing 
modern Western psychology of cultural arrogance based 
in its current international hegemony, it still is worth 
considering and acknowledging that more and more social 
psychologists in non-Western countries and an increasing 
number of critical psychologists in the Western sphere have 
become dissatisfi ed with the current situation in our fi eld. In 
India and other “Eastern” countries like China, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, one 
can observe a growing interest in so-called indigenous 
psychology, a theoretical and empirical approach that aims to 
overcome the stereotypical, mainly Eurocentric, assessments 
that were in most cases introduced by colonialism and its 
theoretical justifi cations that refl ect ethnocentrism and even 
the racism of times past. Ethnocentrism, mainly in the form 
of Eurocentrism, and the stereotypes that are still effective, 
have a large impact on social and cultural psychological 
descriptions and explanations about the thinking, feeling 
and behavior of non-Western people in non-Western regions 
of the world. This by the way includes the African continent, 
which has been neglected by most social psychologists in 
many regards, for which undoubtedly one of the reasons is 
the almost notorious focus on the “West-East” dichotomy 
without adequately, i.e. practically, acknowledging that 
there is a “North” and a “South” to this world, too. 
The dissatisfaction with the current state of psychology, 
especially with social and cross-cultural psychology, can 
be strongly felt in the so-called “Pondicherry Manifesto of 
Indian Psychology” (2002) issued by 160 participants at the 
“National Conference on Yoga and Indian Approaches to 
Psychology” in Pondicherry, South India. It begins with the 
following assessment:
“We believe that the state of psychology in India is none 
too fl attering. In fact, we fi nd psychology in India unable 
to play its necessary role in our national development. It 
is widely believed that this unfortunate state of affairs is 
largely due to the fact that psychology in India is essentially 
a western transplant, unable to connect with the Indian 
ethos and concurrent community conditions. Therefore, it 
has been said repeatedly that psychological studies in India 
are by and large imitative and replicative of western studies, 
lacking in originality and unable to cover or break any new 
ground” (Pondicherry Manifesto of Indian Psychology 
2002, pp 168)
And as if the authors wanted to expose their former 
colonizers’ fi ction according to which India and the Indians 
had no sense of history and therefore no sense of rational 
science, they continue:
“Our culture has given rise to a variety of practices that 
have relevance all the way from stress-reduction to self-
realization. Rich in content, sophisticated in its methods 
and valuable in its applied aspects, Indian psychology is 
pregnant with possibilities for the birth of new models in 
psychology that would have relevance not only to India but 
also to psychology in general.” 
What one can sense here is the turning away from 
conceiving of Western psychological concepts as the only 
valid scientifi c concepts available. At the same time, the 
authors make clear that psychology as a discipline can 
only profi t from an indigenous approach since it can 
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introduce traditions of thought and alternative theoretical 
and empirical approaches into the discussion that do 
not necessarily challenge the discipline’s universalistic 
orientation but might also contribute to it. Interestingly 
enough, one can recognize a possibility to improve social 
science as it has come to us from the 19th century and from 
European scholars whose theories according to Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s notable book “Unthinking social science” 
(2001) still dominate our current scientifi c discussions and 
views. There is no doubt that this still unfamiliar cognitive 
approach is of utmost importance for dealing with 
stereotypes, including stereotypes in social psychology: 
Unthink them.
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